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Each issue of Innovations consists of five sections:
1. Invited essay. An authoritative figure addresses an issue relating to innovation,
emphasizing interactions between technology and governance in a global context.
2.Cases authored by innovators.Case narratives of innovations are authored either by,
or in collaboration with, the innovators themselves. Each includes discussion of moti-
vations, challenges, strategies, outcomes, and unintended consequences. Following
each case narrative,we present commentary by an academic discussant.The discussant
highlights the aspects of the innovation that are analytically most interesting, have the
most significant implications for policy, and/or best illustrate reciprocal relationships
between technology and governance.
3.Analysis.Accessible, policy-relevant research articles emphasize links between prac-
tice and policy—alternately, micro and macro scales of analysis. The development of
meaningful indicators of the impact of innovations is an area of editorial emphasis.
4.Perspectives on policy.Analyses of innovations by large scale public actors—nation-
al governments and transnational organizations—address both success and failure of
policy, informed by both empirical evidence and the experience of policy innovators.
The development of improved modes of governance to facilitate and support innova-
tions is an area of editorial focus.
5. Letters. Readers comment on essays and papers published in previous issues.
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innovationsjournal.net The remarkable rise of social media has created a dilemma for countries deter-
mined to limit Internet content. With current technology, the standard methods
of Internet filtering—blacklist and block—are not as effective at identifying and
limiting content hosted via Web 2.0 applications, diminishing the impact of regu-
latory action of this sort within the jurisdiction of states.
1 In recognition of this,
public-private transnational cooperation and coercion has been expanding to
close gaps in the enforcement of state-mandated online content restrictions.These
hybrid forms of filtering occupy gray zones of technological, political, legal, eco-
nomic, and social policymaking and are fraught with contradictions and tensions.
A consequence of the internationalization of filtering is the growing demand
for international solutions, many of which call for greater transparency where fil-
tering occurs. However, the growth of social media amplifies the difficult balanc-
ing of interests implicit in the technical filtering of online content, between the
effectiveness of regulation, the legal specificity of regulation, and the transparency
by which regulation is enacted.
In this paper, we describe the regulatory approaches being developed in
response to the emergence of social media, place evolving questions and policy
issues in the context of prior efforts to regulate online content,and summarize the
proposed international solutions. Without cooperation of the governments that
are driving Internet filtering, legally compelling intermediaries to resist interna-
tional filtering may prove to be counterproductive.Even demanding greater trans-
parency—always worthy of protection—may have unintended negative conse-
quences. Collective flexible approaches appear to be the more promising
approaches at this pivotal time in the information wars between governments and
their citizens.
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THE TOOLS OF DISSENT AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM
Although not new to the era of social media, the spread of ideas through commu-
nication technologies has played an important role in the politics and governance
of nations.In turn,new communication technologies have also inspired and influ-
enced the strategies governments use to suppress or disrupt the flow of informa-
tion. At least since an office of censorship was created the 15th century following
the invention of the Gutenberg press, advocates of free and independent speech
and governments have tangled over the use of new communication technologies.
Dissidents and social commentators have consistently adopted and adapted to
the technology of the times. For example, the printing press allowed pamphleteers
writing about independence from Britain, such as Thomas Paine, to reach a rela-
tively large audience at a politically charged historical moment. In France in the
1970s, speeches of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were distributed as cassette
tapes among the Iranian exile community, smuggled into Iran and widely distrib-
uted there,giving voice to the exiled religious leader and seeding the revolutionary
sentiments that led to the overthrow of the Shah.
Since their inception, the Internet and mobile phone technologies have been
central elements in the information wars between governments and their critics.
Activists and organizers advocating on a broad range of issues,from democracy to
women’s rights and environmental issues, quickly adopted these digital tools. It is
not unusual for governments to be slow to adapt to new technologies adopted by
citizen groups and to be forced therefore to scramble to find ways to put the genie
back in the bottle. Websites, weblogs, chat rooms, and text messaging were among
the first digital tools used to promote independent expression and the spread of
information previously controlled by governments or inhibited by the costs and
reach of earlier channels of communication.In many of these countries,including
countries with well-established systems of strict media control,such as China,Iran
and Tunisia,bloggers offered their readers candid and alternative views of political
and social events, with commentary and criticism from independent voices not
found offline. The adoption of Internet tools, however, has not been uniform
around the world; the citizens of other countries, such as Cuba, North Korea, and
much of Sub-Saharan Africa, remain largely unconnected.
The political changes instigated by activists using these new communications
tools are undeniable.A few notable events mark the beginning of the digital age of
protest and mobilization. In the Philippines, activists gathered support for oppo-
sition rallies through text messaging that contributed to the large protests of 2001
resulting in President Estrada’s resignation.
2 A second watershed event occurred in
the Ukraine in 2004. Large scale protests against election fraud by the government
of President Leonid Kuchma were organized using cell phones and website discus-
sion boards. The events, later dubbed the Orange Revolution, led to new elections
and helped sweep the opposition party into power.
3 In these two cases and many
others, it is the expansion of the relatively low cost networks for spreading infor-
mation that has proved to be the catalyst.
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A number of prominent thinkers have noted how the spread of digital tools
has triggered the devolution of power from traditional centralized institutions to
the periphery, shifting the traditional balance of power, particularly in respect to
the control and diffusion of information. Howard Rheingold’s “smart mobs” are
the embodiment of these large-scale mobilizations of citizens, whom he predicted
would wrest a significant shift in
the balance of political and social
power.
4 Terry Fisher and others
have highlighted the enhanced
ability of citizens to shape the
manner in which political and cul-
tural events are debated, drawing
on the concept of semiotic democ-
racy first described by John Fiske.
5
In writing about the impact of dig-
ital networks, Yochai Benkler
argues that citizens now have more
power to contribute to the produc-
tion of media, creating a media
system that is more inclusive,dem-
ocratic, and interactive than previous incarnations.
6 The potential of the Internet
and mobile phones as tools for social and political change has not gone unnoticed
by governments.
CONTROLLING INTERNET CONTENT
Efforts to control Internet content, which we will briefly summarize here, have
been a prominent feature of the brief history of the Internet. These regulatory
efforts provide precedents for current actions and context for understanding the
choices and challenges of regulators now faced with the daunting task of regulat-
ing social media.
The feasibility, practicality, and wisdom of regulating Internet content have
been subject to considerable debate. The mainly unregulated and rapid growth of
the Internet in the 1990s helped to spawn cyber-utopian thinking among some,
best exemplified by the often-cited Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace,which was delivered to the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1996.
7
The opening lines capture the spirit of the manifesto:
Governments of the Industrial World,you weary giants of flesh and steel,
I come from Cyberspace,the new home of Mind.On behalf of the future,
I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us.
You have no sovereignty where we gather.
The aspirations of many to maintain a self-governed domain separate from the
restrictions of geographic nation-states did not, however, survive the test of time.
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As documented by Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, governments have reasserted
their sovereignty in cyberspace, reclaiming much of the ungoverned frontier.
8
Governments proceeded to do battle with illegal content on the Internet in ways
largely consistent with the regulation of communications offline: passing legisla-
tion, identifying and prosecuting violators, and removing the offending content.
This approach is reasonably effective on the Internet as well, except on the same
frontiers where states have always been limited—with content produced overseas,
out of the reach of domestic law.In the age of the Internet,geography and distance
no longer limit the distribution of materials.
Government regulators
have found that they are
able to block access to for-
eign-hosted content with
the use of Internet filters.
This practice, pioneered by
China and Saudi Arabia,
among other countries, has
been proliferating in recent
years. As documented by
the OpenNet Initiative,
9
well over three dozen states
around the world use vari-
ous mechanisms of
Internet filtering, targeting
a broad range of websites
addressing political and
social topics as well as many Internet tools and technologies.
The concept of technical filtering is simple: compile a blacklist of banned web-
sites and block access to these sites.
10 While the idealized architecture of the
Internet is based on the end-to-end principle with little or no interference in-
between, the actual architecture of the Internet includes “choke-points”that facil-
itate the implementation of filtering.
11 The most basic methods for Internet filter-
ing—such as IP blocking—are trivial to apply. However, rudimentary filtering
techniques typically result in either extensive over- or under-blocking, or both.
More elaborate Internet filtering relies on both sophisticated software (to assem-
ble and incorporate the blocking lists) and hardware (to filter Internet traffic).The
most common manifestation of nation-wide filtering is initiated by a government
entity (typically a court or executive agency) requiring Internet service providers
(ISPs) within its jurisdiction to implement filtering of specific websites on the
services that the ISPs offer to citizens of that state.
12
PUBLIC-PRIVATE AND TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES
The tendency of the Internet to untether the distribution of ideas from the con-
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fines of geography has not only helped to spawn innovation but also provided a
strong motivation for seeking transnational mechanisms for controlling content.
The internationalization of Internet content control has been an important factor
since the inception of filtering; the leading software and hardware providers have
tended to be U.S. firms selling technology they claim to be value-neutral or posi-
tive,but which is used to suppress free expression in international markets.Certain
of these companies have faced awkward or negative publicity when their products
turned up in countries such as Burma, China, and Iran. In some cases, sales of
these products would be not only difficult to explain but illegal.
13These companies,
however, are otherwise willing participants and profit from the sale of their filter-
ing products.
A lawsuit filed in France opened a new chapter in the internationalization of
content restrictions, challenging traditional conceptions of jurisdiction. In 2000, a
Paris judge determined that Yahoo! Inc. was violating criminal law banning the
exhibition or sale of racist material by providing French users with access to Nazi
memorabilia on its auction site.
14 Some interpreted this as unleashing a scenario
that, taken to its logical end, would subject any website to the laws of every juris-
diction. The court saw Yahoo!’s actions as infringing on French law in French ter-
ritory.Yahoo! eventually agreed to block French users from sites that host materi-
al considered illegal in France through geolocational filtering, in which websites
and web pages can be restricted to specific locations.Although less than perfect in
pinpointing the location of users, this technique has contributed much to the
growing balkanization of the Internet.
Though the court’s ruling did not “smother the golden goose of e-com-
merce,”
15 a private company had been enlisted to enforce content restrictions for a
foreign government. This is a far different process than the technological imple-
mentation of filters by a state within its borders,even if using foreign technologies.
Many argued that an important and strong precedent was set in this case. Others
dismissed the unique nature of the global Internet as a defining factor in what they
perceived to be a natural extension of governments’ responsibility to address
harms felt locally but caused by a foreign source.
16
ENLISTING INTERNATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES
The experience of Yahoo! with the French courts proved to a portent for further
blocking requests. In 2002, researchers at Harvard Law School found that the
French and German versions of the popular Google search engine were dropping
certain websites from their search results, including hate speech and obscenity.
17
Figuratively speaking, the books were still on the shelves, but the librarian would
not tell the patron their precise location. Although based on laws that clearly ban
hate speech, the filtering of localized search engines was an informal bargain
between Google and the German and French governments.
Unsurprisingly, China would desire concessions from Google similar to those
granted to France and Germany.Google,which had ambitions to capture a healthy
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portion of the expanding Chinese search market, found itself subject to frequent
disruptions in access of its unfiltered flagship search site, Google.com, through
degradations in speed and intermittent blocking. The message to Google was
unmistakable: serious engagement in the Chinese search market would require fil-
tering their search results to the standards of government regulators focused on
maintaining their control over political information.This placed Google on poten-
tially more treacherous footing as compared to its cooperation with France and
Germany.
At the baseline, the number of websites to be de-indexed would be much
greater and include sites that fell well within the bounds of protected speech in
accordance with international human rights standards. Questions about the legit-
imacy of the Chinese government’s controls on information notwithstanding,
Google also became a participant in the purposefully informal system of censor-
ship enforcement in China. China keeps its instructions and orders for filtering
and prohibited content mostly informal and hidden from public view. In a quin-
tessential act of self-censorship, while Google is given official guidance on what
topics to remove from its search service, it has been charged to draw the line for
itself in identifying and purging sensitive content.
18
Within Google, there would be no easy consensus. Andrew McLaughlin,
Google’s senior policy counsel,writing on the Google blog explained at the time of
the company’s decision to enter the market, in January 2006:
19
Launching a Google domain that restricts information in any way
isn’t a step we took lightly.For several years,we’ve debated whether
entering the Chinese market at this point in history could be con-
sistent with our mission and values.Our executives have spent a lot
of time in recent months talking with many people, ranging from
those who applaud the Chinese government for its embrace of a
market economy and its lifting of 400 million people out of pover-
ty to those who disagree with many of the Chinese government’s
policies, but who wish the best for China and its people. We ulti-
mately reached our decision by asking ourselves which course
would most effectively further Google’s mission to organize the
world’s information and make it universally useful and accessible.
Or,put simply: how can we provide the greatest access to informa-
tion to the greatest number of people?
The launch of Google.cn, a China-specific filtered search service, was a watershed
event in the evolution of Internet content control. Ultimately, Google resorted to
a solution that it considered to be thoroughly pragmatic and one that ultimately
could increase access to information in China.The balancing of relevant factors in
these decisions,from Google.de to Google.cn,was undoubtedly a complex process.
They do not appear to have been made on the sole basis of compliance with local
law or conditions mandated for market access, as determined users in all these
countries can continue to access unfiltered results by simply using Google’s pri-
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mary search service, Google.com. Thus, the specific tailoring of search engines to
operate along a spectrum where the richness and availability of information is
compromised for the sake of national values or law. Regardless, at this juncture
Google became committed to, if not entrenched in, what now appears to be a de
facto policy of public-private negotiated transnational filtering at government
behest.
In cooperating with the pressure
from governments, Google is not alone.
Microsoft and Yahoo! had fallen in line
with similar restrictions being placed on
their China services. For example, the
search engine available to Yahoo! users
within China is filtered to match govern-
ment blocking criteria and Microsoft’s
MSN Spaces does not allow users to
name blogs or write posts with certain
sensitive keywords.
FACILITATING PRIVATE ACTION FOR COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION IN THE U.S.
Efforts to curtail online copyright infringement have paralleled efforts to regulate
sensitive political and social content and both have drawn upon similar technical,
legal, and administrative approaches. The U.S. has crafted a strategy that relies
heavily on private action to address the profusion of copyright issues on the
Internet and the impracticalities of implementing monitoring of Internet content
at such a large scale. In the U.S., the law facilitates private-private procedures that
resolve a large majority of such cases without involving courts. The notice and
take-down system is contingent on copyright holders communicating directly with
intermediaries, such as hosting companies, and request the removal of infringing
materials.
This too is a pragmatic solution, though one that leaves many questioning the
underlying biases in the structure of the process. Hosting entities are criticized for
being too quick to take down materials suspected of copyright infringement.
Further,the notice and takedown system may contribute to an imbalance of power,
allowing large corporations to intimidate smaller entities and content contributors
with the threat of legal action, even where the legal basis for removing content is
tenuous.
20 However, from a standpoint of regulatory efficiency, this system works
well; relatively few instances require costly public intervention or private litigation.
THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Just as many governments were settling into blacklist-and-block content filtering
strategies, another revolution in the sharing of information was to complicate
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these efforts: the rise of social media.
21 The growth of social media challenges cur-
rent content control strategies. Compared to traditional media, social media
thrives on a multitude of small producers, where the content is not defined by a
relatively small number of professionals but through countless user contributions.
Technological innovation has again spurred social change—the tools for
aggregating digital media have facilitated the culture and practice of sharing. The
technological advances and falling cost of digital video recorders and cameras have
helped to propel photo and video aggregation sites such as Flickr and YouTube.
22
Although the most prominent, YouTube is but one of many examples of this new
model of content hosting.
Prior to the surge in user-generated content,government censors have had rea-
sonable success in blocking access to specific websites that they deem to be inap-
propriate, offensive, or illegal. In Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab
Emirates, all Internet traffic is routed through proxy servers that allow censors to
block by the specific URL, removing content selectively and more accurately than
the cruder methods found in other countries. China has adopted a unique and
sophisticated system that combines at least three separate blocking techniques.
23
Social media makes filtering more difficult not only because of the amount of
content produced but also because of the multimedia formats commonly used in
this production.With the rise of inexpensive video and audio production,the pro-
portion of text in digital communication has dropped, with more images, videos
and audio filling broadband connections.Earlier advances in indexing and search-
ing text-based communications are not easily applied to multimedia platforms,
complicating content control strategies.
Social activists have been quick to adopt these new communication technolo-
gies.One enterprising social critic in Bahrain made use of readily accessible Google
Earth images to make a simple and powerful pictorial exposé of inequalities of
landownership in Bahrain.
24Google Earth was subsequently blocked in Bahrain for
a few days after this incident.
25
Facebook and other social networking sites have become important aggrega-
tion points for social causes. In a prominent example, a Facebook group, “A
Million Voices against FARC,” served as the node for organizing hundreds of
protests in Colombia that brought several million people into the streets.
26
The digital video revolution has struck even Cuba,a country in which Internet
communications are controlled primarily by preventing citizens from getting
online. A video recording of students confronting the president of the Cuban
National Assembly, Ricardo Alarcon, can be found on YouTube and other video
sharing sites.
27 In Cuba, these videos have circulated on USB flash drives for those
with access to computers but without Internet access. The recording of such an
exchange,as well as the exchange itself,are remarkable events in a country that has
kept dissent in check so successfully and consistently.
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NEW GATEKEEPERS
The remarkable success of social media sites has facilitated the entry of more indi-
viduals and small organizations into the media environment, adding to news cov-
erage, commentary, arts, and entertainment. This success has also made the social
media sites important new nodes in the architecture of information-sharing; the
paradox of the increasing power of individual expression on the Internet is that it
depends now in large part on aggregation points such as YouTube and Facebook.
Moreover, housing vast amounts of content, such as videos, photos, podcasts, and
blogposts, contributed by users, anonymous or not, produces pressure on these
social media platforms to police content on their sites. Many of these challenges
arise not only from government pressure or regulation. Rather, as principal con-
duits for information for millions of users, these new media companies must con-
sider how to regulate user-submitted content in response to market forces, share-
holder interests, and social values and ethical standards.
Whether faced with social, market, or regulatory pressures, social media com-
panies face a complex set of choices related to the selective ban of certain types of
content. Providing access to the most comprehensive set of available resources to
Internet users is a good starting point. Facilitating the removal of illegal material,
as determined by governments in the countries they operate, is a reasonable addi-
tional goal, or, in the case of search engines, not reporting the existence and loca-
tion of these materials. However, the criteria for selecting operational principles
for search engines and social media sites appear to be quite different, a contrast
between providing a link to controversial content and actually hosting offensive
content on one’s servers. With the rise of social media, we have learned that the
architecture for the sharing and distribution of multimedia content is providing a
platform for incredibly reckless, violent, and thoughtless users. Social media sites
have elected therefore to restrict content in ways that search engines have not.User
agreements and terms of service agreements prohibit the posting of material that
many might find highly offensive. The mostly commonly used model for moder-
ating content on social media sites depends on user monitoring and reporting of
offensive content, and is augmented by technical tools and company oversight.
This strategy appears to be a reasonably robust approach towards moderating
content with a very large volume of submissions. The success of this strategy relies
on the flexible implementation of general standards, with the companies as the
ultimate arbiters of what is acceptable or not. However, a case-by-case review of
the most difficult cases is also warranted, although time-consuming and thereby
expensive.For example,YouTube suspended a user’s account in the fall of 2007 for
posting graphic video clips of torture. This user was Wael Abbas, a prominent
Egyptian human rights activist and blogger documenting the excesses of the
Egyptian police.
28 Citing a misunderstanding between Abbas and the company,
YouTube reinstated his account following a strong outcry among rights activists.
The complex calculus of determining how to balance conflicting objectives will
remain—in this example, limiting exposure to graphic violence and reporting on
innovations / spring 2008 173174 innovations / spring 2008
human rights abuses.
Although sexually explicit and violent materials are continually removed from
YouTube and Flickr,this type of content monitoring system is neither designed nor
easily adapted for the needs of government censors. Rather, this system is intend-
ed to suit the needs and sensibilities of the companies and their user communities.
However, the norms that help to guide this process vary considerably across com-
munities and countries, creating tension between standard global use policies of
the site and local values. This raises the legitimate question of whether additional
interventions are warranted to ensure that content is congruent with local values.
GOVERNMENTS ENTER THE FRAY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
It is no surprise that social media sites have become the next target for government
content restrictions. Though not designed for this purpose, these sites have inad-
vertently become a channel for circumventing many of the most common control
mechanisms. Images and videos documenting the protests and ensuing govern-
ment crackdown in Burma in the fall of 2007 were distributed via blogs, aggrega-
tion sites, and dissident organizations and media outlets around the world. The
digital recording and sharing of these events stand in sharp contrast to the protests
of 1988, which were not so readily visible to the world. This undoubtedly con-
tributed to the Burmese junta’s decision to shut down the entire Internet in Burma
for the better part of three weeks in the wake of the turmoil,
29 though significant
damage to the official version of events had already been done.
30
Technological capacity is a vital consideration in the evolution of filtering pol-
icy. For governments, the surge in multimedia file sharing on the Internet has
made the prospect of controlling Internet content more complex.With the profu-
sion of user-contributed posts, images, and videos, governments have no hope of
keeping up with the production of content. Even software providers that have
helped to carry out filtering functions are less capable of sorting through and cat-
egorizing the growing body of information and opinions.The net result is that the
recent increase of user-generated content reduces the effectiveness of the blacklist-
and-block model. While blacklist-and-block strategies for controlling Internet
content will not become obsolete in the near future, these familiar tools must be
complemented with newer,more sophisticated strategies to remain effective and if
regulators hope to police social media.
In following the strategy taken with the major search engines, regulators are
again looking to intermediaries to assist in restricting content. These intermedi-
aries are most commonly the transnational technology companies, some of which
are in fact the same companies that faced earlier pressure—YouTube is owned by
Google and Flickr by Yahoo!. Major aggregation sites are enlisted as potentially
powerful gatekeepers, joining ranks with government regulators, search engines,
and ISPs. As with the ISPs before them, these social aggregators are now another
focal point in the ongoing struggle over acceptable expression via the Internet.
Yet these new social media companies are not eager participants in limiting
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content on their sites, particularly if this means negotiating such restrictions with
dozens of regulators around the world.Their success is contingent upon providing
content and continued access to global Internet markets, not in restricting users
from content they would choose to view.
THE “BLOCK OR BE BLOCKED”DILEMMA AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE
TRANSNATIONAL FILTERING 
With the growing political salience of social media sites, governments’ threats to
blockade access to their markets has been an effective bargaining tool in pushing
for increased censorship that spans international borders. Based on negotiations
between foreign governments and private companies, this type of filtering is the
latest manifestation of efforts being waged transnationally to enforce local content
standards. However, in more recent instances it is not courts publicly deciding to
pressure the private actors, as in the example of the Yahoo! case in France, but
rather executive branches of governments using private requests to apply coercive
pressure to enlist the cooperation of these companies.As we discuss later, transna-
tional negotiations offer flexibility and the scope for pragmatic informal solutions,
but at the cost of decreased transparency and reduced reliance on clearly articulat-
ed formal legal processes.
As the world’s leading video-sharing website,YouTube has recently found itself
embroiled in several difficult policy challenges that are reflective of the emerging
conflicts and policy issues involved in policing “borderless”social media.The large
amount of content available on YouTube, especially political satire and video
footage of unfolding political events,makes it a target for blocking by governments
who find themselves vulnerable to critique, mockery, and unwanted exposure.
Few countries have the capacity to block individual videos,and even where this
is technically possible, it is infeasible in practical terms to keep apace with the vol-
ume of material being posted, and reposted if taken down. ISPs in many of the
countries that are intent on blocking YouTube content, but do not have the capa-
bility to filter individual videos, have few choices: they can do nothing, block the
entire YouTube site, or lean on Google to selectively block videos for them. More
than a dozen countries have at times chosen the “nuclear” option, blocking the
entire YouTube site in response to a relatively small number of undesirable video
clips. Over the past two years, YouTube has been blocked in a wide number of
countries, including Armenia, Brazil, Burma, China, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco,
Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. In most
of these cases, the blocking of YouTube has been intermittent, and in many
instances, short-lived. Most of these countries are accustomed to strong oversight
of traditional media and are struggling to achieve similar control over the Internet.
For YouTube, it has become clear that they would not be ignored.
In April 2007, the Thai government moved to block a number of videos
appearing on YouTube that had no apparent objective except to offend King
Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand. In Thailand, insult to the King is not only in
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poor taste, but constitutes lese majeste—the crime of defaming, insulting, or
threatening the royal family. It is punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment.
YouTube’s Terms of Use policy states that users may not submit material that
is contrary to applicable local, national, and international laws and regulations.
31
At the time,YouTube did not believe that the removal of these videos insulting the
King of Thailand was warranted,claiming it would not assist in implementing cen-
sorship for videos that did not violate its use policy.
32 However, YouTube did
engage in a process of publicly tracked negotiations with the Thai government. By
May 2007, YouTube had modified its position, removing a number of the cited
videos for violating its user agreement.
33 The overall block was lifted in August
2007 upon Google’s creation of a “program” of geolocational filtering that would
only block access to these disputed videos for users in Thailand.
34
The opposition to lese majeste is firmly grounded in Thai law and culture,
though it is not a concept congruent with norms of free expression in the West.
However, Google had already embarked along a slippery slope of participation
(and some would say complicity) with censorship regimes, from Google.de to
Google.cn. In this context, YouTube’s initial refusal to cooperate with the Thai
authorities appeared to be more of a clash of political and social sensibilities,open-
ing it to criticism that it defended its market interests more than any discernible
stand on promoting free expression. It is unclear whether the existence of demo-
cratic processes of governance in a given country factors into companies’decisions
to accept delegated filtering responsibilities, or whether all government requests
are considered presumptively legitimate.
It is not publicly known how many times Google has been pressed into this
“block or be blocked” situation, though it is likely that there are many more inci-
dents than those reported in the press. Were Google to adhere consistently to the
explanation of its Google.cn policy, it could increase the net flow of information
to YouTube users in these countries by selectively removing the relatively small
number of videos that offend in certain countries, thereby preempting the more
costly blocking of the entire site. Regardless,YouTube has been placed on this tra-
jectory of public-private transnational efforts to achieve a “bordered Internet,”
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one that would drive future negotiations with the government of Thailand as well
as potentially dozens of countries around the world.
CODING FOR A FRACTURED INTERNET
Larry Lessig’s iconic assertion, code is law, aptly describes an essential element of
the institutions and infrastructure that govern expression on the Internet.
36
Software writers have wielded a strong influence on the accessibility of Internet
content around the world,whether in designed filtering software or in configuring
routers used for filtering. The decisions taken in the coding of social media web-
sites will also make them more or less conducive to filtering.
Investigations by YouTomb,a project of the MIT Free Culture group,appear to
have uncovered the code for a technical mechanism that YouTube uses to imple-
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ment selective, geolocational filtering.YouTomb was formed to explore the devel-
opment of automated means for detecting and identifying videos on YouTube that
infringe on copyright.
37 In the course of their research, they found a tag appearing
on a number of YouTube videos:
[media:restriction type=“country”relationship=“deny”>TH]
In this example,the country code,TH,refers to Thailand.A video with this tag can
be seen anywhere YouTube is available, except Thailand. The majority, but not all,
of the videos leveling insult at the King tested by ONI and YouTomb carry the
restriction flag. When trying to access these clips, users of the Thai ISP CAT see a
pink band across the top of the YouTube page which states,“This video is not avail-
able in your country.”
As demonstrated with the solution imposed by Yahoo! France in 2000, this
geolocational filtering capability is not new. Businesses have long been leveraging
this technology to target the presentation of materials, sales strategies, and adver-
tising by region and language.It is also a useful device for companies to work with
governments to abide by local law. For example, the accessibility of gambling sites
can be tailored to its legality in various jurisdictions.
However, as a highly informal and nontransparent mechanism, the country
restriction flag also introduces the risk of escalated transnational filtering across
public-private lines.It provides a resonant example of how governments can nego-
tiate censorship with private actors with scant public knowledge, oversight, or
involvement. The flag can be easily scalable to block videos in many more coun-
tries in a process that remains largely opaque. This architecture, while itself value-
neutral, can be as readily applied to illegitimate suppression of speech as it is to
lawful ends. For example, in contrast to the private-private mechanisms of allow-
ing users to flag videos for removal,there does not appear to be a way for ordinary
users to code this country restriction flag.
38 The videos identified thus far to carry
this country restriction flag suggest that certain private interests as well as govern-
ment authorities have prevailed on YouTube to assist in regulating content.
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INTERNET FILTERING: TRANSPARENCY, EFFICACY, AND SPECIFICITY
The growing prominence of social media sites highlights the trade-offs inherent in
implementing content filtering on a large scale and the tensions between efficacy,
specificity, and transparency. Blocking of Internet content often lacks transparen-
cy and is frequently carried out without resort to formal legal procedures. When
done surreptitiously, filtering is also arguably more effective in preventing citizens
from accessing what their governments determine to be inappropriate material.
Transparent government regulation that follows well-defined legal procedures is
offset by reduced effectiveness in preventing users from being aware of and access-
ing sensitive content online. These competing tensions create policy challenges for
governments that seek to limit online content in an era where social media plat-
forms are ascendant, offering citizens greater opportunities for political participa-
tion.Transparent,legally formalized regulation that is also effective may be consid-
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ered ideal. However, the continual growth in the amount of information on the
Internet from international sources makes this infeasible using current technolo-
gy.
Some recent examples associated with blocking access to Internet sites eluci-
date these trade-offs. In February 2008, a federal judge in the United States sought
to block access to the website Wikileaks (http://www.wikileaks.org) after the Swiss
bank Julius Baer filed suit against the website for publishing its leaked documents.
40
From a legal standpoint,the grounds for blocking the entire website were dubious.
The blocking of the Wikileaks website would entail the removal of a great amount
of material unrelated to the complaint.
41 Despite this and other serious problems
with the original court order, the order was both specific and transparent, which
many consider essential aspects of Internet regulatory decisions. It also proved to
be highly ineffective, as mirrored versions of the website remained available
throughout the period of enforced blocked.
42 After the ban was ultimately lifted,
Judge Jeffrey White shared his realization that it is next to impossible to suppress
information once released on the Internet. He remarked, “Maybe that’s just the
reality of the world that we live in.When this genie gets out of the bottle,that’s it.”
43
In another example, the organization that represents the international record-
ing industry, IFPI, convinced an Israeli ISP to block the website,
www.httpshare.com.The block resulted in significantly higher traffic to the site,so
much so that the site administrators had to upgrade their equipment in order to
handle the additional traffic. In both of these examples, open attempts to censor
the Internet proved to be unsuccessful. It is natural for the online public, once
notified of an instance of Internet filtering, to drive more traffic to the targeted
sites, which are easily moved and mirrored to multiple new sites if necessary to
avoid blocking orders.
Many countries have grappled with the question of transparency in blocking
decisions and few have chosen to adopt a high standard of transparency. The vol-
untary filtering systems in place in a number of European countries and Canada
are designed to block access to child pornography. The blocking lists that they
compile are not public. In Finland, an anti-censorship website that chose to pub-
lish the block list of so-called child pornography sites was subsequently filtered
itself.
44 For governments,there is a natural logic in deciding to not publish lists that
identify pornography. However, for those that seek to ban Internet content, the
practical implications of making a blocking list public apply equally to any content
category, whether pornography, copyright, or political speech; publication is at
odds with the objective of inhibiting access and reducing traffic to these sites.Yet,
without some measure of transparency, it is difficult to construct a system by
which the blocking of sites can be assessed and debated by the public.
Turkey currently implements one of the most transparent filtering regimes. A
Turkish cybercrimes law enacted in May 2007 allows for ISPs to seek court
approval for blocking of content that insults Kamal Ataturk and incites suicide,
drug use, and prostitution, and administrative discretion over blocking of child
pornography and obscenity.
45 When it finds offense with videos on YouTube ridi-
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culing Ataturk and other Turkish leaders, it relies on court orders to block all of
YouTube until the content is removed from the site. The Turkish block page
includes the name of the court and the case number.
46 To date it has blocked
YouTube (several times),WordPress, and Google Groups.
47 However, the adminis-
trative and legal costs involved in this highly formal process make this filtering sys-
tem less nimble. Turkey’s method, in which millions of sites hosted on WordPress
were blocked in response to a single defamation claim, also results in significant
overblocking. On balance, this may levy a heavier collateral cost than YouTube’s
geolocational filtering of a select number of
videos.Attempts to legally formalize processes
to achieve complete transparency complicate
the practicability, effectiveness, and costs of
executing content restrictions. For societies
that value transparency, there are no simple
ways to filter the Internet effectively and com-
prehensively.
A more prevalent version of transparency
is also less stringent—notifying users when
they attempt to access a blocked website.
48 To
their credit, Google informs users when the
results of a search query have been filtered:“A
portion of these search results cannot be dis-
played in accordance with local laws and regulations.” YouTube similarly discloses
when a video is unavailable: “This video is not available in your country.” These
notifications are better than no notification at all. However, they do not provide
users information on the processes, negotiations, and concessions underlying the
censorship. For search engines, the list of sites that are removed from search
results—sites that are effectively made invisible to most users—is not available
publicly. The level of review and oversight has not been publicly disclosed, nor is
the decision-making process transparent.The public is not informed of the discus-
sions or negotiations that result in actual filtering decisions.
Specificity in governmental filtering decisions is also difficult to implement.
Legislation that determines what is impermissible speech is necessarily general;
defining hate speech or obscenity defies easy criteria that can be codified into law.
Nevertheless, if content on the Internet is to be banned, someone must translate
general standards into specific blocking decisions. Such specificity in blocking, if
applied by formal governmental process, is difficult to reconcile with effective
Internet regulation. Turkey is attempting just such an approach, but is very limit-
ed in the scope of their blocking at present. Judicial review of individual websites
and user-generated content on social media sites would be onerous on a large scale
and nearly impossible on social media sites with existing technology.
Legally mandated and formalized Internet content restrictions are problemat-
ic in other ways as well. To be effective, mandatory blocking of specific websites or
submissions to websites generally involves prior restraint on free speech.Although
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most of the world does not share the same level of aversion to prior restraint as the
United States,highly formal filtering procedures that require filtering of a substan-
tial number of websites are less likely to withstand legal challenges in many coun-
tries. It is thus not surprising to see a significant reliance on informal and volun-
tary programs, and on the action of private companies based in foreign countries
as the recipients of informal filtering requests and as the administrators of filter-
ing. The most pragmatic solution is often a more informal and less exacting legal
process.
The compromise in Germany has been to enact voluntary agreements with
foreign companies, the details of which are not subject to public scrutiny. From
China to Germany to Thailand, these determinations of illegal content also seem
to fall into the realm of “I know it when I see it.” This lends itself poorly to a for-
malized regulatory process specified by law.
The preference of certain governments to institutionalize informal public-pri-
vate transnational filtering can also erode processes meant to ensure accountabili-
ty. For example, although Thailand became one of the only countries in Asia to
require court authorization when it passed a cyber crimes law in June 2007, in
practice it appears to prefer informal filtering via country restrictions flags and
enlisting Google to engage in geolocational filtering on its behalf.
One of the consequences of the Internet’s architecture is that reasonable and
appropriate content restriction policies may be effective only if implemented in
ways that are not easily palatable for open societies. Although this tension existed
before social media reached its current level of popularity and utility, its stupen-
dous growth has brought these trade-offs and contradictions to the fore.
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
China represents an exception to the choices facing other countries and for the
companies operating there. One consequence of the government’s simultaneous
priorities of growth and control has been the effective emergence of public-private
localized filtering.China has promoted the development of Internet infrastructure
and e-commerce while pursuing aggressive filtering, media clampdowns, and
other rigorous restrictions on expression. A robust internal market for Internet
services and content catering to the cultural and language specifications of 210
million Chinese Internet users has somewhat insulated users from the collateral
social and economic costs of filtering.
49 The local Chinese-language search engine
Baidu dominates the market,and YouTube’s accessibility issues have paved the way
for a rash of Chinese-language video sharing sites.
50
Whereas international companies continue to grapple with the human rights
impacts of doing business in certain jurisdictions, Chinese companies have little
room to maneuver or negotiate around the government’s stringent requirements
for self-policing of news and other content. As a result, they are the most effective
executors of a growing filtering mandate. China provides a model that promotes
the growth of domestically managed, and regulated, social media sites. This is
Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang, and John Palfrey Censorship 2.0
undoubtedly an attractive notion for many other countries around the world.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO FILTERING:
RENEWED FOCUS ON INTERMEDIARIES
The success of social media companies has brought with it both greater scrutiny
and more responsibility. Just as governments lean upon the intermediaries to help
with content regulation, those in favor of greater openness, enhanced privacy and
high transparency have looked also to Western technology companies.
The companies that provide the transnational public spaces of the Internet
have thus become the focal point of the debate over permissible speech on the
Internet.They are subject to pressure from both sides of the debate—those espous-
ing greater openness and those pushing for further restrictions. This will remain
so unless and until governments are able to improve their ability to control online
speech, particularly via social media sites that are already difficult to monitor. It is
not clear which side will gain advantage in the next battle of the technology wars,
providing another opportunity for debate between cyber-utopians and cyber-real-
ists.
Governments and technology companies continue to negotiate ways to oper-
ate social media platforms across multiple jurisdictions without triggering further
blocking of entire platforms and websites.A much smaller number of countries are
investing in deploying technology that will allow selective blocking of content on
social media sites.
51 The tacit principle underlying this government-driven
approach is that each country will determine what constitutes acceptable speech
for its citizens and has the discretion to restrict speech that falls outside of these
norms. On a basic level, this is difficult to dispute. However, the waters are mud-
died by the perceived failure of many countries to live up to their international
commitments to uphold human rights related to freedom of expression,
52 as well
as the inherent difficulties in identifying impermissible speech.
A series of separate but related dialogues are occurring that may help to shape
the future of this issue that do not directly involve the governments that have
aggressively sought to censor the Internet. These approaches suggest hopes for a
convergence in either the substantive or procedural standards in defining accept-
able speech, rather than country-specific solutions to defining and enforcing per-
missible content.Within the United States and Europe, proposed legislative initia-
tives would seek to influence the actions of technology companies and perhaps
their ability to do business in countries that limit privacy and free speech on the
Internet.
53 Early versions of legislation in the United States sought to limit the lat-
itude of action for technology companies working in repressive countries. Zittrain
and Palfrey have called this process, which places legal restrictions on technology
firms as a response to actions initiated by foreign governments, second-order reg-
ulation.
54 This approach is problematic in a number of ways. For this approach to
be implemented,some institution or agency must be given authorization for deter-
mining where speech restrictions have been inappropriately applied. Delegating
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governments the authority to regulate acts in other sovereign jurisdictions, even
indirectly, is questionable.
55 Furthermore, the attempt to define the bounds of
acceptable speech would be subject to the same potential pitfalls of excessive dis-
cretion and restriction. Laws that prohibit technology companies from participat-
ing in censorship may force them to disengage from a number of countries. Even
requiring greater transparency, for example compelling Google, Yahoo!, and
Microsoft to disclose the websites and content they filter,may have the same effect.
However politically popular at the time, legally binding the hands of technology
companies doing business in repressive regimes does not seem to have withstood
intense scrutiny; this form of legislation has been set aside in the United States.
Alternative legislative approaches have been proposed in the United States. One
proposal would require thorough human rights impact assessments prior to enter-
ing markets in countries that restrict online speech.
Another dialogue is underway with technology companies,socially responsible
investors, international human rights organizations, and academic institutions to
craft a collective voluntary response to these challenges based on a code of conduct
that would guide the actions of technology companies in international markets.
56
This collective approach has the potential to help all parties,including the technol-
ogy companies and human rights groups,to better understand the risks and impli-
cations of conducting business in repressive regimes. If successful, it would also
inform and shape the policy positions and responses of governments, as well as
build public awareness. There have been a number of similar multi-stakeholder
initiatives in the past designed to promote better corporate ethical behavior in
international business.
57 One of the remarkable facets of this dialogue is the level
of overlapping commitment between private sector and advocacy groups to
increasing the flow of unfiltered information. While one side protects free expres-
sion as part of its revenue strategy, the other is engaged solely in order to promote
human rights and social justice.
This voluntary approach might either replace or complement U.S. regulatory
action. One promising line of attack would be to use the voluntary principals as
the basis for future legislation, providing the authority and legal framework to
ensure broader compliance with the principles.
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A limitation with these international initiatives that aim to reduce Internet fil-
tering is that they focus almost entirely on the intermediaries and not on the
source of these restrictions—foreign governments.Given this fundamental limita-
tion, it is unclear how far the efforts of technology companies and non-govern-
mental organizations, even when working collaboratively, can go to address these
growing tensions.
Another alternative—intergovernmental action—has not gained any traction
to date. Nevertheless, Google has attempted to raise the issue to this level, publicly
requesting help from the U.S. government in invoking restrictions on free speech
as a trade issue.
59 This strategy has resonated in Europe as well.
60 Although prelim-
inary, this approach may relieve the growing pressure on technology companies
coming from both sides,even if it does not provide a genuine solution to the ques-
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tions being posed. In the meantime, the technology companies that provide the
nodes for social media will continue to be the focus of attention.
The public-private transnational negotiations that lead to selective filtering are
not without potential benefits. Despite the lack of transparency and accountabili-
ty, this channel has provided limited checks on government authority as technol-
ogy companies have not always acquiesced to the filtering demands of govern-
ments. Ultimately, the various actors involved in the filtering of social media face
choices that mirror the precarious balancing of values and interests evident in the
Google.cn decision.
Many believe filtering is
categorically wrong and
that selective filtering by
Western technology compa-
nies represents an unaccept-
able compromise. However,
advocates for free expres-
sion on the Internet are not
likely to win a debate that
hinges on the notion that
sovereign states should not
be able to regulate online
speech. Moreover, while
international intermediaries
may be adopting limits on
expression that many would
find repugnant or overly
restrictive, they are likely
increasing overall access to
information in the short
term by selectively filtering content.This is almost certainly true when the alterna-
tive to selective filtering is the wholesale blocking of an entire website that acts as
an important social media node.
A bigger point of uncertainty is the long-term impact of these complex deci-
sions on Internet freedom,an area where principle-based and pragmatic strategies
are difficult to separate. Adopting an absolutist stance in discussions with govern-
ments may well contribute to greater long-term openness if access to internation-
al social media sites becomes a significant issue in countries’ policies towards
Internet filtering. It may also be that taking a principled stand on free expression
is simply the right thing to do and will leave a positive and enduring example for
countries engaged in these decisions. On the other hand, international technology
companies that refuse to cooperate with governments may actually encourage
states to hasten development of domestically owned and regulated alternative
providers, nullifying their leverage and increasing competition. As domestic mar-
kets for social media and other online content grow, as with China, there may be
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fewer opportunities to engage in public discourse over the normative standards
governing the substance and process of Internet content regulation.
CONCLUSIONS
The profusion of political commentary, photographs, and video hosted on social
media sites,such as social networking,photo sharing,and video sharing platforms,
creates a policy conundrum for many governments around the world.
Governments must consider whether to open the gates to social media, block
these services entirely, or attempt to enlist technology companies to selectively
block content. Many have already blocked popular sites in their entirety, despite
the obvious costs to millions of users. If this trend continues, the implications of
these content restriction decisions, both in costs and benefits, will become more
acute; the platforms for political and social openness are difficult if not impossible
to distinguish from those driving knowledge accumulation and economic growth.
While the collateral costs of blocking popular sites continue to grow, the political,
social, and cultural ramifications of allowing unfiltered access to the Internet also
increase. For countries that place high priority in transparency, public consulta-
tion, and open review of decisions that restrict freedom of speech, abandoning
Internet filtering altogether might be the best alternative.
Regulatory responses have thus far been unable to keep apace with the speed
of technological change, and an increasing number of governments are moving
towards this public-private transnational form of filtering. At the same time, the
search for international solutions that address the tensions in online content reg-
ulation, particularly involving innovative social media platforms, has been slowed
by the complexity and high degree of uncertainty over the efficacy of policy inter-
ventions.It is still unclear how short-term actions to resist or comply with Internet
censorship may impact the long-term objectives, such as persuading governments
to embrace greater Internet openness. Moreover, international actions designed to
promote free expression online in one country may reduce Internet freedom in
another. Negotiated, informal, selective filtering agreements between governments
and companies may alleviate some of these tensions and curtail the most extreme
effects, but occupy a gray zone in which transparency and public accountability
can be sacrificed. For those that espouse greater openness, the best responses are
more likely to come from a flexible public-private partnership than from more
rigid government mandates.
The economic and educational benefits of an unrestricted Internet represent
one of the strongest arguments for Internet openness. Advocates have a chance to
more convincingly demonstrate the innovative aspects and benefits associated
with social media and Web 2.0 applications. The policies and technologies of reg-
ulation may soon catch up with the distributive power of social media.
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